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Abstract 
Individual differences in behavior are understood generally as arising from an 
interaction between genes and environment, omitting a crucial component. The literature on 
animal and human learning suggests the need to posit principles of learning to explain our 
differences. One of the challenges for the advancement of the field has been to establish how 
general principles of learning can explain the almost infinite variation in behavior. We 
present a case that: 1) individual differences in behavior emerge, in part, from principles of 
learning; 2) associations provide a descriptive mechanism for understanding the contribution 
of experience to behavior; 3) learning theories explain dissociable aspects of behavior. We 
use four examples from the field of learning to illustrate the importance of involving 
psychology, and associative theory in particular, in the analysis of individual differences, 
these are; i) fear learning, ii) behavior directed to cues for outcomes (i.e., sign- and goal- 
tracking), iii) stimulus learning related to attention, and iv) human causal learning. 
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A goal of research into learning is to characterize how behavior changes with 
experience within and across species. Thorndike’s (1898) Law of Effect was an early attempt 
to characterize the effect of experience on behavior. In offering a general law of how 
experience contributes to behavior, Thorndike was also giving an account of how an 
individual becomes unique. 
The classic example of Thorndike’s method involved cats and an apparatus known as 
a puzzle box (Thorndike, 1898). The box was a rudimentary cage with latches and gates to 
afford escape. The cats’ dislike of confined space provided a natural motivation to engage in 
behaviors that might serendipitously lead to release. Thorndike observed that the cats made 
many false starts but eventually made a response that enabled escape. With repeated exposure 
to the box, latency to escape decreased. The Law of Effect stated that behaviors preceding 
any form of ‘satisfaction’ (e.g., escape) would be reinforced and made more likely on 
subsequent trials. However, rather than considering this principle as limiting an animal’s 
flexibility to learn, the law only restricts the conditions for learning. Consider that outside the 
lab, different humans can successfully complete a motivated goal in different ways. They 
may behave differently but the same Law of Effect strengthens their behaviors.  
The goals of this paper are to present the case for the individual differences approach 
to learning theory. We will argue that (1) learning mediates the influence of genes and 
environment on behavior and (2) there is complexity, to be explored, within models of 
learning that can account for diversity in learning. Specifically, we suggest that while genes 
and environment may contribute to the development of differences in learning, that an 
individual’s phenotype interacts with experience and the memories of experience to further 
cause individual differences. As such, the study of individual differences in associative 
learning offers an insight into one of the prime mechanisms contributing to adaptive 
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behaviors. Further, detailed examination of associative principles, can provide novel insights 
into the etiology of variability in behavior. 
There is considerable complexity within even the simplest models of association and, 
where differences in learning are observed, it is necessary to isolate the basis of this 
difference. After all, to understand individual differences is the ultimate explanandum for 
psychology and one that is omitted by a psychological theory that focuses on group 
differences. We present a case that learning theories, and associative theories in particular, 
provide a guide to explain how different dissociable aspects of behavior develop. 
Because psychology traditionally treats differences as a window into disorders, we 
will focus broadly on clinically relevant individual differences, considering in turn the 
etiology of anxiety, addictions, schizophrenia, and depression. Through these examples, we 
argue that, research has identified relevant individual differences in associative learning. It 
almost goes without saying that there is considerable work to be done, but we strongly argue 
that too much work neglects the contribution of learning. Or where learning is acknowledged 
it is treated simply as a reflection either of genetic or environmental factors. Just as 
researchers strive to isolate the specific genes contributing to a heritable difference, the study 
of individual differences in associative learning should seek to isolate specific parameters of 
learning relevant to differences in behavior.  
We start with a general introduction to the role of learning as a mechanism for genetic 
expression to influence behavior. We set out a simple model of learning and highlight how 
differences across components of this model can account for a range of individual 
differences. We also argue that the traditional role of the associative mind (the memories and 
use of memories of an organism), as reflection or mediating variable between genes and 
environment (see Figure 1, left panel), is insufficient. 
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We take an associative perspective on learning for three reasons. The first is that this 
area of research has existing animal models. Animal models provide powerful tests for the 
effects of learning in controlled genetic and environmental conditions, conditions that are 
impossible to control with people. Secondly, this area of research has sensitive tools and 
experimental designs that are lacking in some other areas. Finally, the associative analysis 
described is the level of algorithmic analysis necessary to have a mechanistic account of the 
mind (e.g., Baker, Murphy & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). 
The Source of Individual Differences 
A modern interpretation of individual differences sees them squarely rooted in the 
interaction between an individual’s genes and their environment (Flint, Greenspan, & 
Kendler, 2010). The interaction between genes and environment is complex and dynamic. 
This is true for even the simplest of phenotypes. For example, a standard example of a gene x 
environment interaction, given by Rutter (2010), is the pinkness of flamingos. A diet rich in 
shrimp and certain plankton will produce the lovely pink hue of the flamingo. The same diet 
for a mouse will not have the same effect (see the bidirectional arrow in the left panel of 
Figure 1). Thus, the influence of the environment on a phenotype depends on the genotype.  
However, even this interaction is not quite so simple. Heritability is relative; genes 
depend on the environment to determine expression of the phenotype.  Further still, the 
interaction between gene and environment is dynamic, with the genotype influencing the 
environment that will influence its expression (Kendler & Baker, 2007). For instance, the 
Wilson Effect describes the increase in the heritability of IQ with age; monozygotic twins 
become more, rather than less similar, as they age (Wilson, 1983). This reflects changes in 
gene expression over the developmental lifespan and the influence that the expression of 
genotype has on shaping environment (Bouchard, 2013).  
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Dynamic interactions shift the focus away from finding specific genes or 
environmental factors and towards identification of the complex interactions (Plomin, 
DeFries, Knopik & Neiderheiser, 2013). Especially in the context of complex phenotypes, 
such as differences in human behavior, the early promise of identifying single causal genes 
has been replaced with a realization we need to understand a complex multi-causal pathway 
(Rutter, 2010; Kendler, 2005). There is no gene for any behavioral trait but rather, 
psychological and behavioral traits are the result of a complex multi-causal web of effects 
reflected in the interaction of gene, mind and environment (Right Panel of Figure 1).  
One of the limitations of the analogy of the pink flamingo, when applied to complex 
behavior, is that the psychological variables that contribute to the cause behavior are not 
simple reflections of experience. Rather, memories reflect accumulated experience distilled 
over the lifespan. For instance, initial, innate, differences, such as the speed of learning (e.g., 
Kaufman, De Young, Gray, Jimenez, Brown & Mackintosh, 2010), can influence learning in 
a given experience, but this in turn can compound differences in learning about future 
experiences.  
To elaborate one example, while a fear of dogs may involve the simple gene- 
environment interaction (shown in the left panel of Figure 1), the fear is also a result of how 
an individual learns and how that learning has captured the experience with dogs (what we 
are calling the contents of Mind). Currently an individual’s risk for dog phobias might be 
understood in terms of genetic risk for a negative reaction to a dog encounter if exposed to an 
environment with aggressive dogs. However, to determine whether someone will develop a 
phobia requires more than simply understanding the genetic and environmental factors. 
Rather, there is every sense in which the contribution of previous learning is distinct and has 
its own causal power to behavior. Further, learning can have effects on environment and the 
expression of genes, for instance, some forms of memory relate to alternations in gene 
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expression (see Bronfman, Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2016). As such, we argue that the 
explanatory power of the gene x environment interaction is enhanced by considering a gene x 
mind x environment interaction.  
The biopsychosocial model of behavior provides a frame of reference for such a 
tripartite interaction (e.g., Dodge & Pettit, 2003; Engel, 1989; Suls & Rothman, 2004; 
Jablonka & Lamb, 2014). This model proposes that biological (potentially genetic) factors 
interact with social (environmental) factors in addition to psychological factors (our 
associative mind), such that the environment does not always have a direct effect on our 
emotional state or behavior, but rather, psychological factors, such as how we think about and 
interpret experiences, can moderate the influence of the environment (e.g., Ellis, 1980). We 
argue that taking a comparable approach with associative learning will enhance our capacity 
to explain individual differences in behavior. While both genetic and environmental factors 
may contribute to differences in associative learning, how the environment influences 
behavior can be influenced by how we learn from experience. The etiology of behavior needs 
to be understood as a Gene x Mind x Environment interaction as displayed in the right-hand 
panel of Figure 1 (see also Kendler, 2005).  
The previous focus on genes, environment and their interaction implies somehow that 
the associative content learnt from experience plays no active role in influencing future 
behavior. This emphasis mirrors an early behaviorist position that posited that the content of 
cognitions had no causal role in behavior (i.e., Skinner, 1938, 1945). The strong behaviorist 
position suggested that behavior could be explained on the basis of an animal’s genetically 
determined behavioral repertoire and the environmental contingencies to which it was 
exposed (i.e., Skinner). In contrast, we argue that memories for stimuli and processes of 
association have causal actions (see also, Kirsch, Lynn, Vigorito & Miller, 2004). However, 
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identifying the nature of these effects requires careful experimentation (e.g., Patitucci, 
Nelson, Dwyer & Honey, 2016). 
Consider this approach to individual differences in perceptual sensitivity to stimuli. 
Sensitivity to stimuli in the environment can be traced directly to genetic factors, but learning 
can also have an influence. Visual acuity has a genetic component, and would be expected to 
enhance or interfere with any memory for a perceived event. However, differences in 
sensitivity to visual, auditory, olfactory, proprioceptive cues can also be learnt. Consider the 
ability of the wine connoisseurs’ olfactory performance (Bende & Nordin, 1997) or a 
musician’s pitch perception (Micheyl, Delhommeau, Perrot & Oxenham, 2006). While there 
may be innate differences in sensitivity to taste or pitch, perceptual skills are honed through 
years of experience and training. 
If any clearly traceable genetic difference was likely to provide a test case for the 
understanding of psychological differences, the easily identifiable genotype differences 
determining males from females, might be assumed to be a simple starting place. Except for 
race and intelligence, difference in physical and psychological ability attributable to 
biological sex is possibly the most studied potential source of individual differences (e.g., 
Halpern, 2012). Animal learning research has been able to study sex without the confounds of 
acculturation that mire human research and many sex differences are amenable to a learning 
analysis.  
For instance, sensitivity to color and hue are central to sexual selection and 
reproductive success in guppies, primates and humans (e.g., Endler & Houde, 1995). Sex-
based developmental refinements to the visual processing systems may have their origin in 
processes of natural selection and be in place from birth or early in development (Bornstein, 
Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976; Ling, Hurlbert, & Hurlbert, 2011). However, other differences 
may emerge later in development as a product of learning.  
Individual Differences  9 
 
For example, in the visual system of the female stickleback fish (Gasterosteus 
aculeatus), the retinal cones respond more to light in the red spectrum than those of their 
male counterparts, reflecting differences in sensitivity to sensory stimuli (e.g., Rowe, Baube, 
Loew, & Phillips, 2004; Aron & Aron, 1997; Smolewska, McCabe, & Woody, 2006). 
Genetic differences in wavelength sensitivity can contribute to a behavioral preference that 
has coevolved with the red wavelength mating signals of males (Rick, Mehlis, & Bakker, 
2011). However, differences in responsivity to light may also emerge as a function of 
experience; literature from different species in different learning paradigms is consistent with 
an associative interpretation that stimuli that have previously been reliable predictors of a 
valued outcome increases relative to other stimuli (Baker & Mackintosh, 1979; Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2003; Mackintosh, 1973, 1976). Thus, a stimulus (such as the color red) predictive 
of a valued outcome in a mating context may acquire a higher associability or salience, 
increasing the rate of future learning. With sticklebacks, Smith et al., (2004) provides 
evidence that female preference for mates with red throat is a generalized bias from a 
foraging preference. In the zebrafish (Danio rerio) this type of preference is learnable 
(Spence & Smith, 2008). Simply observing individual differences in sensitivity to light in an 
adult fish does not isolate the etiology of this difference, it might relate to genetics, previous 
experience, or current learning environment.  
In humans, there are common cultural beliefs about sex differences in preference for 
color, a visit to a child’s clothing store or toy shop will provide the immediate evidence for 
this assertion. In the West, there is the stereotype that boys prefer blue and girls prefer pink. 
However, we know that the same colors can be preferred by the opposite sex given different 
culture-specific environmental exposure (e.g., Al-Rasheed, 2015). While studies of human 
infants have found little evidence of innate differences in color perception (Bornstein et al., 
1976), there is evidence that development contributes to preferences in adults (e.g., Ling et 
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al., 2011). While these may reflect differences in sensory processing that emerge from 
physical development, they can equally arise as a result of experiential development. For 
example, a preference for blue may be the result of specific rewards for choosing blue or may 
be even more subtle, arising from exposure to blue resulting in elaboration of the mental 
representation of blueness and second order associations (Mundy, Honey & Dwyer, 2007; 
McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000).  
The example of color preference illustrates that learning from experience can produce 
differences that not only influence behavior but establish differences in learning which will 
shape the influence of future experience. However, observing differences in learning does not 
isolate the cognitive processes that contributes to that difference. To isolate this, we need to 
look carefully at the parameters that influence learning. As we outline in the four examples 
below, this is a complex problem, that requires careful manipulation of experimental 
parameters. We argue that the field of learning has the necessary tools to address this 
challenge. 
What the Standard Learning Model Can Do: Causal Roots to Individual Differences.  
One way to develop our understanding of how individual differences in behavior 
arise, is to test specific parameters of learning. Where two individuals differ in learning, this 
difference might relate to different parameters of an experience influencing learning. Most 
models of learning are attempts to describe how a change in behavior or cognition is related 
to environmental experience. We argue that there is considerable complexity in the parameter 
space of existing models, capable of accounting for a diversity of learning.  
A typical classical conditioning scenario involves learning that a previously neutral 
stimulus (CS; e.g., brief tone) precedes the presentation of an outcome, or unconditioned 
stimulus (US; e.g., food; Pavlov, 1927). Through repeated presentation of the CS preceding 
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the US, the strength of association between the CS and US increases. Variables that influence 
the rate and strength of associative learning relate to factors specific to the cue (or response), 
the outcome, and any pre-existing association between the two events (for a review, see 
Nasser & Delamater, 2016). A mathematical instantiation of the learning process provides a 
framework for considering the relationship between these variables. For example, the 
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model is an associative model that assumes that the change in 
strength of association is governed by a minimum of three variables; the associability, or 
learnability, of the cue or CS (), the associability or motivational significance of outcome, 
the US (), and the limit on the strength of the association supported by the US (). Change 
in associative strength is dependent on the strength of the association previously acquired 
(V), and thus given in Equation 1.  
Equation 1: V =  *  ( – ∑V) 
These variables provide a useful starting point and are common across many other 
models of association learning (e.g., Hull, 1943; Sutton & Barto 1998; Mackintosh, 1975; 
Pearce, 1987; Dayan & Abbott, 2001).  
An explanation for why two individuals’ behavior differs can be reached by assuming 
differences in any one of the variables (or their interaction. For instance, the simple 
presentation of a CS paired with a US might be expected to result in an increment in 
association between the two. Even without considering their previous experiences, all 
theories of learning can account for how two different individuals experiencing the same 
events might learn different amounts. Two individuals might differ with respect to perceptual 
sensitivity ( to the cue or motivation for learning about the US (). Previous experience has 
an added effect; the effect on associative learning from a single pairing of two events could 
be small if the individual has already acquired an association (and the gap between and V is 
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small) or large if there has been no prior experience. Generalization of learning from similar 
stimuli, determined by overlap of elements or perceptual similarity, will influence the 
associative strength (V) and thus the rate of current learning (e.g., Pearce, 1987; McLaren & 
Mackintosh 2000; Soto, Gershman & Niv, 2014; Brandon & Vogel, & Wagner, 2000; Gluck, 
1991; Bush & Mosteller, 1951). 
This means that characterizing how individuals, who come to the lab as fully formed 
organisms, come to possess their behavioral profiles is extremely complex. In addition to this, 
as introduced with the stickleback example above, learning is dynamic, such that one learning 
experience will not only influence associations between CS and US, but will change the 
parameters for future learning. For instance, experience with a CS as relatively reliable 
predictor of a US may increase the associability of the CS ( relative to other stimuli, 
accentuating future learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Le Pelley 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh 
2010).  
We set out here to work through four examples, considering individual differences in 
fear learning, differences in behavior to cues for outcomes, differences in learning about cues 
for outcomes that relate to attention and human causal learning. In these examples, we 
consider the role of learning in the etiology of individual differences in behavior, how 
differences in learning develop and summarize the attempts to isolate the basis of such 
differences in learning.  
Example 1: Fear Conditioning and Individual Differences in Anxiety 
Enhanced or Deficient Fear Conditioning? 
Anxiety is a general feeling of unease experienced from time to time and a common 
emotional response to situations of threat. Anxiety for a stimulus or environment experienced 
with aversive outcomes is a common result following fear conditioning. The relationship 
Individual Differences  13 
 
between our emotional responses and our aversive experiences provides insights into the 
etiology of anxiety disorders (Barlow 2002; Mineka & Zinbarg 2006; Mineka & Oehlberg, 
1998). However, while it is estimated that up to 95% of people are exposed, at some point in 
life, to the form of traumatic event that might lead to fear conditioning, only a small minority 
of trauma survivors develop a clinical disorder (Engelhard et al., 2008). Thus, a stress-
diathesis model of psychopathology (e.g., Monroe & Reid, 2009; Monroe & Simons, 1991) is 
widely invoked to explain how genetic risk, such as threat-related reactivity in specific 
regions of the brain (e.g., amygdala; Hariri, 2009) or genetic polymorphisms affecting 
serotonergic and dopaminergic system function (e.g., Gordon & Hen, 2004; Sen, Burmeister 
& Ghosh, 2004; Lonsdorf, Weike, Nikamo et al., 2009; Londsdorf, Ruck & Bergstrom et al., 
2010) may provide an explanation of the individual difference that interacts with experience. 
We argue that the gap between experience and the development of anxiety disorders 
might also be bridged by differences in how individuals learn about aversive events. Further, 
we suggest that such difference can be captured within the parameters of models of 
associative learning. It is quite easy to find research that eschews psychologically described 
quantitative models as explanations for individual differences. For instance, Gershman and 
Hartley (2015) have argued that associative models provide relatively poor accounts of 
individual differences in fear conditioning. They propose instead that individuals differ 
qualitatively, clustering into definable state learners (one-state or two-state), learning either to 
store acquisition and extinction trials in separate memories or in the same memory, with the 
difference between these approaches predicted by the individual’s prior belief about the 
structural complexity of the learning environment. Contrary to Gershman and Hartley’s 
position, differences in learning about contexts, integration of cue learning with contexts, and 
competition between cue and context learning have been accommodated within models of 
learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Murphy, Baker & Fouquet, 2001). We outline here 
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how careful manipulation of fear conditioning experiments has improved understanding of 
how individuals differ in fear conditioning. We argue that future work along these lines 
should enhance our understanding of the parameters, within models of associative learning, 
that may contribute to individual differences in anxiety.  
Fear conditioning can be shown using either simple (single cue S+) or discriminatory 
(S+, S-) learning procedures. Previously it has been argued that anxiety is related to strong 
fear conditioning, but this conclusion is based largely on studies using simple conditioning. If 
we instead consider studies that have used discriminative conditioning, the data suggest a 
different interpretation, wherein anxiety may be associated with a deficit in the selectivity of 
learning. 
Simple fear conditioning involves pairing a neutral CS with an aversive US, so that 
the CS comes to signal the US and evoke anticipatory fear for the aversive US (the 
conditioned response; CR). In a discriminatory fear conditioning paradigm two stimuli are 
presented during acquisition; one CS is paired with the US (CS+), while another CS is never 
paired with the US (CS-). The CS- should come to act as a safety signal. The difference in 
CR elicited by CS+ and CS- is measured.  
The discriminatory fear conditioning paradigm makes explicit a discrimination that is 
implicit in simple fear conditioning. In a simple fear conditioning procedure, participants 
must learn that the combination of CS and context cues the aversive outcome, while the 
context presented in isolation acts as a safety signal, cueing the absence of the aversive 
outcome. Thus, while there is no explicit CS-, participants have to discriminate between the 
CS+ and the context, which is presented with and without the US. This is arguably a more 
complex discrimination than that which is presented in the discriminatory fear conditioning 
procedure. 
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Individuals with high levels of anxiety show elevated conditioned responses, 
indicating fear, to the CS- but do not show stronger responses to the CS+ (Duits, Cath, 
Lissek, Hox, Hamm, Engelhard & Baas, 2015). These results suggest that anxiety relates to 
impaired discrimination and high levels of generalization between CS+ and CS-; specifically, 
anxiety may be associated with a deficit in the selectivity of associative learning (Lissek, 
Rabin, McDowell et al., 2009). 
While successful fear conditioning leads individuals to learn that the CS predicts the 
aversive US, a deficit in associative learning deprives individuals of the ability to predict 
when the US will occur, creating an unpredictable situation and sustaining anxiety (Lissek et 
al., 2009). Failure to learn a CS-US association may leave the context, in which the CS and 
US are presented, as the best predictor of the US, resulting in elevated contextual fear 
conditioning and a chronic state of apprehension (Baas, van Ooijen, Goudriaan, & Kenemans, 
2008; Grillon, 2002; Seligman & Binik, 1977; Bouton, 2002). Indeed, sensitivity to the CS-
US contingency appears to be closely related to a reduction in context anxiety (Baas et al., 
2008; see also Cohen-Kadosh, Haddad, Heathcote, Murphy, Pine & Lau, 2016; Murphy & 
Baker, 2004). 
This is a comparatively new hypothesis for the etiology of anxiety. An earlier meta-
analysis of fear conditioning studies, found a relationship between anxiety and strong fear 
conditioning, observing stronger conditioned responses to CSs in anxious individuals to  
(Lissek et al., 2005). Rather than simply being interpreted as the consequence of anxiety, 
researchers had suggested that accentuated fear conditioning might be part of the etiology of 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001; Wolpe & Rowan, 1988). This 
incomplete conclusion reflected an over-reliance on simple tests of fear conditioning, which 
do not provide an opportunity to assess learning with safety signals (Duits et al., 2015). Tests 
of simple fear conditioning overlook the possible influence of cue competition (Beckers, 
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Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, Kindt, 2013). Further exploration of individual differences in 
learning, incorporating more complex and nuanced tests, has already radically changed our 
understanding of individual differences.  
 
What Causes the Deficit in Discrimination Learning? 
Fear conditioning is used as a robust test to assess facets of anxiety (e.g., for review 
see, Fullana, Harrison, Soriano-Mas, Vervleit, Cardoner, Avila-Parcet & Radua, 2016). 
However, it is not clear what underlies the deficit in discrimination learning. Even 
incorporating discriminatory fear conditioning tests, the tasks currently employed to study the 
relation between learning and anxiety do not readily provide information about how 
individuals differ in learning. We have yet to identify what it is about learning in anxious 
states that contributes to altered fear conditioning and more importantly, what differences in 
learning contribute to the development of anxiety. As we set out below, several alternative 
factors could contribute to reduced discriminatory fear conditioning.  
Hypothesis 1: individual differences in the motivational value of the presence (the rate 
of learning about the US, βpresent) and absence (the rate of learning about the absence of the 
US, βabsent) of aversive stimulus (US) could contribute to reduced discriminatory learning. It 
is quite a common general finding that US absence is less effective than US presence 
(Wassermann, et al., 1993), indeed some basic learning phenomena require this assumption 
(Murphy et al., 2001a, 2001b; Wagner, Logan, Hablerlandt & Price, 1968). We might thus 
extend this idea to make the assumption that individuals differ in the extent of the variation in 
the motivational value for the presence and absence of aversive US. Particularly high βpresent, 
and low βabsent, may result in intact learning about CS+ but impaired learning with the safety 
signal provided by CS-. In this case, weak discrimination would be the result of normal levels 
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of generalization combined with reduced ability to learn about the absence of the aversive 
US.  
Hypothesis 2: high levels of generalization between CS+ and CS- would similarly 
result in poor discrimination. Lissek and colleagues (2009) observe that elevated 
generalization provides an analogue of symptoms of panic disorder, proposing that 
conditioned fear to a neutral stimulus, occurring coincident with panic (CS+), generalizes to 
exteroceptive and introspective stimuli resembling the CS+ (Lissek et al 2009, see also, 
Bouton et al 2001, Goldstein & Chambless 1978, Mineka & Zinbarg 2006). Elevated 
generalization may reflect retarded perceptual learning or sustained high levels of attention 
for many irrelevant features in the learning environment (e.g., McLaren, Kaye & Mackintosh, 
1989) 
To dissociate these explanations, conditioning paradigms need to assess 
generalization between stimuli and the motivational value of the outcome. While this may 
require additional assessments to be conducted alongside tests of conditioning, more precise 
tests of discriminatory fear conditioning have existed for decades, but are employed 
infrequently. To give one example, the human conditioned startle-potentiated paradigm 
measures the magnitude of startle probed during inter-trial intervals to serve as a baseline, 
from which startle during CS+ and CS- can be compared (Grillon, Ameli, Woods, 
Merikangas & Davis, 1991). This approach has an advantage over paradigms which simply 
measure and directly compare responses in the presence of the CS+ and CS-. This 
differentiates the influence of conditioning with the stimulus and the context. As both stimuli 
are trained in the same context, the discriminatory learning reflects learning about the stimuli 
in conjunction with the context and responses to either stimulus may be influenced by 
contextual fear conditioning. In particular, apparent generalization of responding to the CS- 
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may reflect responding to the context. It is thus important to measure learning about the 
context, in addition to the CS+ and CS-.  
Beckers and colleagues (2013) further argue that standard tests of fear conditioning 
provide a poor analogue for anxiety, partially because they focus on the punctate or specific 
fear experience. To understand how dysfunctional fear conditioning may contribute to the 
etiology of anxiety, they suggest that ambiguity is crucial. While unpredictable aversive 
events are a risk factor for anxiety (Seligman & Binik, 1977), many fear conditioning 
protocols use hedonically strong stimuli with one CS clearly signaling danger, while another 
clearly signals safety. Addressing this gap, recent studies have considered learning with 
ambiguous stimuli, assessing the influence of anxiety in tests of blocking (A+, AB+) and 
protection from overshadowing (C-, CD+; Arnaudova, Krypotos, Effting, Boddez, Kindt & 
Beckers, 2013; Boddez, Vervliet, Baeyens, Lauwers, Hermans, Beckers, 2012). Future 
studies may benefit from following this lead and studying learning in conditions of 
ambiguity.  
The Perruchet effect provides a further opportunity to explore individual differences 
in learning in situations of ambiguity. The effect involves a situation of ambiguity in which 
participants are exposed to a 50% contingency between a CS and US (originally a puff of air 
to the eye; Perruchet, 1985; Weidemann, Tangen, Lovibond & Mitchell, 2009). Under 
conditions of ambiguity, dissociations have been observed between psychophysical indices of 
anxiety, such as conditioned skin conductance responses, and cognitive measures, such as 
expectation of the aversive outcome (McAndrew, Jones, McLaren & McLaren, 2012). Such 
dissociations underline the potential contribution of associative learning to individual 
differences in anxiety. 
Gershman and Hartley’s (2015) proposal to abandon an associative approach to 
account for individual differences in fear conditioning, rests on the fact attention, memory, 
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motivation, and goals interact with and influence learning. Such interaction does not require 
us to abandon the associative approach. Rather, following recent suggestions, we advocate 
continued manipulation of experimental design to further our understanding of the specific 
learning factors that contribute to anxiety (Beckers et al., 2013). 
To summarize this section, gene x environment interactions are invoked to explain 
individual differences in the development of anxiety. Individuals differ in learning in a fear 
conditioning procedure, with generalized apprehension associated with failure to learn the 
CS-US contingency. Differences in how individuals learn may interact with genetic and 
environmental factors to influence the etiology of anxiety. However, the basis of individual 
differences in fear conditioning has yet to be isolated. Identification of this basis will provide 
a more precise account of the etiology of anxiety.  
Example 2: Sign-tracking and individual differences in addiction 
 The interest in individual differences in fear conditioning developed from a mismatch 
between exposure to trauma and development of anxiety. A similar gap is apparent in the 
addiction literature. Only a very small proportion of individuals exposed to licit or illicit 
drugs will develop compulsive drug seeking behavior (Belin, Belin-Rauscent, Everitt, Dalley, 
2016). However, for individuals who do become addicted, the source of the addiction and 
associated cues have a powerful hold. The most predictable outcome of the first diagnosis of 
a drug addiction is relapse (DeJong, 1994). Individuals who have become addicted are unable 
to shift their thoughts and actions away from the drug and associated stimuli (Flagel, Akil & 
Robinson, 2009). When addicts encounter stimuli previously associated with the drug, such 
as drug-related paraphernalia, places, or people, these often instigate renewed drug seeking 
and / or craving for the drug (for review see, Childress, Hole, Ehrman, Robbins, McLellan & 
O’Brien, 1993). Stimuli that have acted as a predictive cue for a drug appear to acquire the 
ability to maintain and instigate drug taking behavior in part because they acquire incentive 
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motivational properties through classical conditioning (Berridge 2001; Bolles 1972; Toates 
1986).  
 The pairing of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US) in 
classical conditioning can evoke complex emotional and motivational states (Rescorla, 1988). 
The conditioned response (CR) may include orientation towards, approach of and 
engagement with the CS (Brown & Jenkins, 1968; Hearst & Jenkins, 1974). Through 
conditioning, different components of the task (e.g., the CS or the context) may acquire 
incentive salience, becoming a ‘wanted’ stimulus (Berridge, 1996). Where stimuli have 
acquired this new property, they (a) elicit attention and approach behavior (Flagel, Watson, 
Akil & Robinson, 2008; Hearst & Jenkins, 1974; Peterson, Ackilt, Frommer & Hearst, 1972), 
(b) can act themselves as conditioned reinforcers of other behavior (Diciano & Everitt, 2004; 
Williams & Dunn, 1991), and (c) can evoke conditioned motivation, instigating reward 
seeking or energizing ongoing behavior (Dickinson et al., 2000; Lovibond, 1983; Wyrell & 
Berridge, 2000).  
 Individual differences have been observed in the propensity for CSs to acquire 
incentive salience. Zener (1937) described individual differences in classical conditioning 
with dogs. As in Pavlov’s earlier experiments, a bell was paired with food. However, animals 
were not restrained. Zener (1937) observed that after training, some dogs responded with an 
initial glance at the bell, followed by a fixed interest in the food bowl, while other dogs 
approached the bell. This difference has been described as sign-tracking (i.e., interest in the 
CS, the bell) vs. goal-tracking (i.e., interest in the location of the US, the food bowl) and has 
been widely studied in auto-shaping experiments with rats (see Hearst & Jenkins, 1974; 
Holland, 1980). Individual differences in sign-tracking and goal-tracking have also been 
reported in human behavior (e.g., Garofalo & di Pellegrino, 2015).  
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 Animals engaging in sign-tracking will approach the CS (the sign), while animals 
engaging in goal-tracking will approach the location where the US will be presented (the 
goal). Flagel and colleagues (2009) stress that both sign-tracking and goal-tracking are 
learned responses conditional on CS-US experience. Once learned, the tendency of sign-
trackers to approach the CS remains stable (Flagel et al., 2009). From this perspective sign-
tracking looks to be a learned response, which once established will interact with 
environmental factors to increase risk for addiction. Mapping this onto a gene x mind x 
environment interaction, genetic disposition and environmental exposure creates the 
opportunity to sign-track, which once established, moderates the influence of future 
experiences on behavior.  
Why do individuals differ? 
 Recent research has focused on identifying a neural and genetic basis for sign-
tracking (see Patitucci et al., 2016, for discussion). Exploring a genetic basis of sign-tracking, 
Flagel et al., (2010) compared auto-shaping in rats bred for high (bHR) or low (bLR) 
locomotor reactivity to a novel environment. Previous research had shown that bHR rats 
acquire cocaine self-administration more rapidly than bLR rats (Davis, Clinton, Akil & 
Becker, 2008) and exhibit greater corticosterone response to a mild stress and express lower 
levels of glucocorticoid receptor mRNA in the hippocampus (Clinton, Miller, Watson & 
Akil, 2008). Indicating a genetic basis for sign-tracking, Flagel and colleagues (2010) found 
that bHR rats were more likely to develop sign-tracking than bLR rats.  
 Further research has suggested a role for the neurotransmitter dopamine in sign-
tracking. Some research suggests that phasic dopamine serves as a prediction-error signal 
necessary for learning associations (e.g., Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Waelti, Dickinson & 
Schultz, 2001; although see Byrom & Murphy, 2016). While phasic dopamine responses 
have been observed to shift from US to CS over training (Schultz, 2016), Flagel et al., (2011) 
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only observed this shift in sign-tracking animals. They argue that dopamine acts selectively, 
attributing incentive salience to cues for reward in some subjects, for whom reward cues 
come to powerfully motivate and control behavior. Flagel and Robinson (2017) argue that the 
difference between sign- and goal-tracking may relate to a difference in dopamine signaling 
in the core of the nucleus accumbens, an area critical for the attribution of incentive salience 
to cues for reward. Differences in dopamine transporter expression, associated with faster 
dopamine uptake in the core of the accumbens, are seen in animals that sign-track (Flagel & 
Robinson 2017; Signer, Guptaroy & Austin et al., 2016; Flagel et al., 2010; Flagel, Watson, 
Robinson & Akil, 2007).  
 Based on this research into the genetic and neural basis of sign-tracking we might 
draw the conclusion that individual differences in dopamine activity underpins the attribution 
of incentive salience to CS, leading to sign-tracking and risk for addition. To summarize, 
sign-trackers have been suggested to be more susceptible to addiction than goal-trackers 
because they are motivated to seek drugs in the presence of drug-related stimuli (Robinson, 
Yager, Cogan & Saunders, 2014). This hypothesis is consistent with reports that sign-
tracking in rats is associated with a range of factors considered to be a risk for addiction, 
including action-impulsivity, novelty seeking and low attentional control over behavior 
(Beckmann, Marusich, Gipson & Bardo, 2011; Paolone, Angelakos, Meyer, Robinson & 
Sarter, 2013; Belin, Berson, Balado, Piazza & Deroche-Gamonet, 2011; Belin & Deroche-
Garmonet 2012; Jentsch & Taylor 1999; Molander, Mar & Norbury et al., 2011; Flagel et al., 
2010).  
 However, these conclusions may be premature. The focus on genes has overlooked 
the influence that environmental factors can have in the development of sign-tracking. There 
is evidence that while sign-tracking can develop to discrete visual stimuli, it is unlikely to 
develop even to localizable auditory stimuli (Davey & Cleland, 1982; Davey, Phillips & 
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Cleland, 1981; Cleland & Davey, 1983). Further, both the contingency and contiguity 
between CS and US can influence the development of sign-tracking. For instance, Boakes 
(1977) demonstrated that changes in the US probability influenced the development of sign-
tracking; if only 50% of CS presentations were paired with reward, sign-tracking was more 
likely to develop than if every CS presentation was paired with reward. Other experiments 
have demonstrated that increasing the spatial or temporal contiguity between the CS and US, 
results in a decline in sign-tracking (Brown, Hemmes, De Vaca & Pagano, 1993; Costa & 
Boakes, 2007; Holland 1980; Silva, Silva & Pear, 1992). The influence of these 
environmental factors and the role of learning on the development of sign-tracking questions 
the prominence of simple biological or genetic predispositions. 
Further, while links have been made between dopamine and incentive salience, Flagel 
and colleagues (2009) outline that the difference between sign-trackers and goal-trackers is 
not a difference in attribution of incentive salience, but a difference in where incentive 
salience is attributed. In sign-trackers, incentive salience is attributed to the CS. In goal-
trackers incentive salience is attributed to the spatial location in which the US is presented, or 
to the wider contextual cue for the US. Saunders and Robinson (2012) identified that while 
sign-trackers may be at elevated risk of relapse in the presence of discrete drug cues in the 
environment, goal-trackers showed greater context-conditioned hyperactivity and context-
induced reinstatement of drug seeking than sign-trackers. This suggests that for goal-trackers, 
the context has acquired incentive salience, so that contextual cues motivate behavior 
(Robinson et al., 2013).  
Robinson and colleagues (2013) suggest that psychological processes govern the 
difference between sign-tracking and goal-tracking. Mapped onto our gene x mind x 
environment model, this suggestion highlights the potential role of the mind in mediating the 
interactive influence of genes and environment. Considering possible differences in the 
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mechanisms of learning, Di Feliceantonio and Berridge (2012) note that sign-trackers attend 
to the CS predicting the occurrence of the US. Where the CS is a reliable predictor of the US, 
the CS will be the most reliable predictor of the US, but may not be the last stimulus 
encountered before consuming the US. Sign-trackers are thus using contingency over 
contiguity. By contrast the goal-trackers are attending to the location in which the US is 
delivered. This is much less informative; as this stimulus is always present, it should be 
associated with the presence and the absence of the US. However, the precise location where 
the US is delivered is always the last thing seen before the reward, so while there is a low 
contingency between this stimulus and the US, there is high contiguity. Di Feliceantonio and 
Berridge (2012), thus suggest that contiguity remains important for controlling learning for 
goal-trackers. This distinction between the effects and relevant importance of contiguity over 
contingency is echoed in the distinction between model free and model based learning on the 
basis of evidence in which local experience for instances is more or less relevant than an 
extracted generalization from continuous experience. Model based learning makes 
assumptions about how the experience is incorporated (e.g., Quinlan, 1993). 
Where then, would sign-tracking fit into our concept of a gene x mind x environment 
interaction? Is sign-tracking an endophenotype for addiction? For a behavior to be classed as 
an endophenotype, it must be heritable, must not be state dependent and must segregate with 
the related behavioral phenotype within families (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). To classify 
sign-tracking as an endophenotype implies that it is a facet of learning that is an intermediate 
step between a genetic factor and a complex phenotype. This would rule out possible 
environmental factors influencing sign-tracking.  
It is notable that compared to the exploration of the genetic basis of sign-tracking, less 
research has considered the, potentially relevant, environmental factors. This is curious as 
early studies indicated that sign-tracking was dependent on the CS-US contingency and 
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contiguity (e.g., Boakes 1977; Brown et al., 1993; Hearst & Jenkins, 1974; Holland 1980). 
Recent work has focused on using the distinction between sign-tracking and goal-tracking as 
an animal model to develop our understanding of the role of dopamine in reward learning. In 
this respect, research in sign-tracking draws parallels to the work in latent inhibition (as 
discussed below), where, rather than exploring the environmental and behavioral parameters 
necessary to induce latent inhibition, research has moved to focus on understanding 
individual differences and its neural basis.  
As illustrative of the ambiguity around the importance of sign-tracking for individual 
differences in addiction, a recent study of sign-tracking provides evidence to argue that the 
general distinction between sign- and goal-tracking is inaccurate as the tendency to sign- or 
goal-track is US specific (Patitucci et al., 2016). Patitucci and colleagues found that goal-
tracking was dependent on the value of the reinforcers, such that individual differences in 
sign- and goal-tracking were not consistent across different CS-US relationships.  
Novel experimental designs, using eye-tracking to assess value-modulated attentional 
capture, provide an opportunity to explore the relationship between sign-tracking and 
addiction in humans. Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths and Beesley (2015) observed that 
participants are more likely to look at a distractor that signals the availability of high reward 
as compared to one that signals the availability of low reward, even when looking at the 
distractor led to the omission of the reward. This suggest that Pavlovian signals of reward 
elicit automatic attentional capture. Of relevance to sign-tracking and addiction, greater 
reward-modulated attentional capture is associated with greater risk of illicit drug exposure, 
particularly in those with less cognitive control (Alberta, Copeland, Pearson, Watson, Wiers 
& Le Pelley, 2017; Wiers, Boelema, Nikolaou & Gladwin, 2015).  
There are parallels to be drawn between sign-tracking and other learning effects 
discussed in this paper. For example, in the distinction between sign- and goal- tracking we 
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see a difference in the attribution of incentive salience to discrete or contextual cues. In 
relation to anxiety, we outlined a difference in the acquisition of discrete CS-US associations 
compared with context-US associations. This parallel deserves attention in future research as 
addiction is frequently co-morbid with anxiety (Grant et al., 2004).  
In summary, individual differences in sign-tracking may contribute to the risk for 
developing addiction, interacting with environmental and genetic factors in a gene x mind x 
environment interaction. The focus on identification of the genetic and neurobiological basis 
of sign-tracking may frame individual differences in learning as purely genetic, removing any 
necessity to consider the independent causal status of sign-tracking. However, we suggest 
that it is too early to draw such a conclusion as environmental factors and individual 
differences in the value ascribed to environmental factors such as the US in particular, have 
some influence over sign- and goal-tracking. The next steps here might be to consider 
whether genetic and environmental factors interact to induce sign-tracking and isolate 
specifically, in terms of associative processes, how sign- and goal- tracking differ.  
Example 3: CS Processing Effects, Schizotypy and Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is characterized by attentional abnormalities that impact learning, for 
instance, reduced selective attention and an inability to tune out irrelevant stimuli (Frith, 
Stevens, Johnstone, & Crow, 1979; McGhie & Chapman, 1961) or use contextual 
information to guide processing (J. A. Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Smith, & Hemsley, 1991; 
Hemsley, 1987; Patterson, 1987). A deficit in selective learning, such as a heightened 
tendency to learn about irrelevant stimuli, may be part of the etiology of schizophrenia, 
contributing to delusions and hallucinations (J. A. Gray et al.,). While this definition appears 
to specify individual differences in learning (attentional abnormalities), there remains 
considerable disagreement about the causal basis of schizophrenic-related differences in 
learning.  
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Individual differences in relation to schizophrenia and, more often, trait measures 
relating to schizophrenia (e.g., schizotypy; Claridge & Broks, 1984; Mason, Claridge, & 
Jackson, 1995) have been observed in a range of CS focused effects, as summarized in Table 
1, and illustrated in Figure 2. In referring to CS focused effects we are considering effects 
such as blocking, overshadowing, latent inhibition and learned relevance.  
Blocking and overshadowing are instances of stimulus selection effects and 
demonstrate that the association between CS and US does not depend simply on the 
characteristics of the CS, its correlation with the US or even past experience with the CS. 
Rather, blocking and overshadowing suggest that learning may be affected by the nature of 
the other CSs present at the same time and prior experience with co-presented CS 
(Mackintosh, 1975; Pavlov, 1927; Kamin, 1969).  
 
Deconstructing Latent Inhibition 
Latent inhibition and learned relevance demonstrate that prior experience influences 
the rate at which learning occurs with a given CS. Latent inhibition shows that exposure to a 
stimulus in the absence of a US can retard subsequent performance acquiring a CS-US 
association (Ginton, Urca, & Lubow, 1975; Lubow & Moore, 1959). The learned relevance 
effect demonstrates that prior experience can also influence the associability of stimuli; 
learning with a CS that has been a relatively reliable predictor of an outcome will proceed at 
a greater rate than learning with CS that has previously been a poor predictor of the outcome 
(Baker & Mackintosh, 1979; Bennett, Wills, Oakeshott, & Mackintosh, 2000; Le Pelley & 
Schmidt-Hansen, 2010; Mackintosh, 1975). 
Schizophrenia-associated disruptions in CS focused learning effects have provided 
support for the Aberrant Salience hypothesis of schizophrenia, with the proposal that 
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individual differences in these effects relate to how stimuli capture attention (Kapur, 2003). 
Schizophrenia has been described as a disorder arising from the misattribution of salience; 
neutral or irrelevant stimuli are treated as salient, leading to the formation of inappropriate 
associations contributing to cognitive noise (Kapur, 2003; Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; 
Jensen, Willeit & Kapur, 2008). While genetic and environmental factors may contribute to 
aberrant salience, their impact on learning may multiply the detrimental effect, with 
dysfunctional mechanisms of learning contributing to the development of hallucinations and 
delusions. However, the observation of individual differences in CS focused effects does not 
isolate the facets of learning that are important. There remain alternative accounts for the 
causal basis of individual differences in learning. This is, in part, because there are alternative 
explanations for CS focused learning effects. To provide an example, we outline the 
alternative hypotheses for the stimulus pre-exposure effect, sometimes referred to as latent 
inhibition.  
Latent inhibition is an effect of retarded learning following simple stimulus pre-
exposure (Ginton, Urca, & Lubow, 1975; Lubow & Moore, 1959). Tests of the effect involve 
two phases. In Phase 1, a stimulus is pre-exposed without pairing with a US. A CS-US 
association is then trained in Phase 2. There are many examples of individual difference in 
latent inhibition (e.g., Baruch, Hemsley & J.A., Gray, 1988a, 1988b; N.S. Gray, Fernandez, 
Williams, Ruddle & Snowden, 2002). While this is a simple protocol, there are alternative 
accounts of the apparent retardation of learning in Phase 2 and individual differences in this 
effect. 
Attention-based hypotheses propose that experience with a stimulus in the absence of 
a paired outcome results in a reduction of subsequent attention directed to that stimulus 
slowing subsequent learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce & 
Mackintosh, 2010). Different attentional accounts of CS associability modulation have been 
Individual Differences  29 
 
developed, though hybrid models have integrated these perspectives (Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce 
& Mackintosh 2010). Mackintosh’s (1975) model of selective attention describes a reduction 
in associability for stimuli that do not reliably predict a meaningful outcome. Thus, in latent 
inhibition, repeated exposure to a stimulus that does not predict a relevant outcome results in 
a decrease in attention to that stimulus, as the irrelevance of the stimulus is learned 
(Mackintosh, 1975). Pearce and Hall (1980) posited that repeated presentation of a stimulus 
can render the stimulus less surprising, reducing associability. Thus, in latent inhibition, 
because the stimulus has been pre-exposed, it is expected and thus captures less attention. 
The hybrid approach recognizes that the associability of a stimulus may change because of its 
previous relative predictive validity and repeated presentation (Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & 
Mackintosh 2010). From this perspective, disruptions in latent inhibition can be related to 
individual differences in CS associability or modulation of CS associability. Failure to update 
CS associability based on experience would result in the absence of the latent inhibition 
effect, as observed in high levels of schizotypy and schizophrenia.  
While widely accepted to explain individual differences in latent inhibition, the 
attention-based hypotheses do not account for data showing that pre-exposure to the stimulus 
influences future performance rather than learning. For instance, the latent inhibition effect 
can be disrupted by presentation of the US in a different context (Kaspow, Catterson, 
Schachtman & Miller, 1984), the passage of time between Phase 1 (pre-exposure) and Phase 
2 (CS-US training; e.g., Kraemer, Randall & Carbary, 1991, Hall & Minor, 1984) and 
‘extinction’ of the context present in Phase 1 (Baker & Mercier, 1982; Grahame, Barnet, 
Gunther, & Miller, 1994; but see also, Hall & Minor, 1984; Zalstein-Orda & Lubow, 1995). 
According to the comparator hypothesis, proposed by Miller and Matzel (1988), which 
assumes that an association between the CS and the context formed during Phase 1 interferes 
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with the expression of the CS-US association, deficits in latent inhibition reflect an inability 
to learn about or use context information.  
Further Oberling, Gosselin and Miller (1999) also showed that deficits in latent 
inhibition reflect an impaired ability to acquire associations with contextual stimuli. There are 
similarities between this proposal and Cohen and Servan-Schreiber’s cognitive model (1992) 
of schizophrenia which focuses on problems with memory, assuming that individuals with 
schizophrenia correctly process contextual information at training, but are unable to maintain 
this information over time and use it to inhibit inappropriate responses.  Therefore, 
disruptions in latent inhibition might also reflect a deficit in ability to express CS-context 
associations or activate the comparison mechanism that would use CS-context associations to 
influence current performance (Escobar, Oberling & Miller, 2002). Thus, there are several 
association-based hypotheses, outlining a range of different causes of individual difference in 
latent inhibition.  
Far from being a simple effect, the source of individual differences in latent inhibition 
remains controversial. From the attentional perspective, differences reflect the allocation or 
modulation of attention. From an interference perspective, differences have been considered 
to reflect either the ability to learn about contexts, the ability to remember learning with 
contexts or the ability to use learning with contexts to influence current performance. 
Future work with humans needs to clarify the contribution of attention and 
interference to individual differences in learning. We highlight here two studies that have 
taken a different approach to isolating the causal basis for individual differences in learning 
in relation to schizotypy.  
 
Approaches to Isolating the Causal Basis for Individual Differences. 
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Combining tests of associative learning is one approach to developing understanding 
of individual differences. For instance, Haselgrove and Evans (2010) tested the assumption 
that individual differences in attentional effects may reflect differences in selective learning, 
and specifically the implementation of a summed error term in learning. Selective learning is 
seen in blocking, where a CS-US association is not acquired when the CS is novel and trained 
in compound with a CS that has already predicts the paired US (e.g., Kamin, 1969; Le Pelley, 
Oakeshott & McLaren, 2005). Individual differences in blocking have been reported, with 
blocking attenuated or abolished in individuals with schizophrenia (e.g., Jones Hemsley, Ball 
and Serra, 1997; Jones Hemsley & Gray, 1992; Moran, Al-Uzri, Watson & Reveley 2003). 
While this difference has been attributed to the selectivity of learning, variance in both the 
selectivity of prediction error and attention could account for differences in blocking. To 
provide a more precise test of the non-selective learning hypothesis, Haselgrove and Evans 
(2010) combined a test of blocking with a test of asymmetrical learning.  
In contrast to blocking, asymmetrical learning, summarized in Table 1, reflects the 
absence of a selective error term. The the change in associative strength of stimuli trained in 
compound is assumed to be governed by the associative strength of each stimulus 
(Haselgrove & Evans 2010). Rescorla (2001) had previously observed that if two stimuli are 
trained as equivalent predictors of a US (A+ and C+) and two stimuli are trained as predictors 
of the absence of the US (B- and D-), prior to A and B being paired with the absence of the 
US (AB-), initial training will influence the rate of conditioning in compound. This should 
only occur if the error term for each of the stimuli trained in compound can change 
independently. The effect of initial training on compound training can be assessed by testing 
the compounds AD and BC. Rescorla found that responding was weaker for AD than BC, 
despite their equivalent associative histories. This asymmetry suggests that more is learnt 
about A than B during the AB- training, indicating a non-selective prediction error.  
Individual Differences  32 
 
 While blocking is dependent on a summed error term, and hence selective learning, 
asymmetrical learning is dependent on the absence of such a summed error term. Therefore, 
to the extent that individuals show a blocking effect, and importantly, the selective learning 
assumed to underpin this, they would not be expected to show asymmetrical learning 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Haselgrove & Evans, 2010). Individuals with high levels of 
introverted anhedonia (a negative schizotypy trait; Claridge & Broks, 1984; Mason et al., 
1995) failed to show blocking but demonstrated asymmetrical learning (Haselgrove & Evans, 
2010). The combination of tasks narrows the range of explanations for individual differences, 
providing of one approach to improve our understanding of individual differences.  
 However, on its own this study has not provided overwhelming evidence that 
individual difference in CS focused effects, such as blocking, relate to the selectivity of 
prediction error. It is important to acknowledge the range of different CS focused effects that 
are relevant for this question. Schizotypy relates to individual difference in latent inhibition, 
learned relevance, and overshadowing, as well as blocking. The logic of Ockham's razor 
suggests that we should expect a common causal mechanism to underpin these disruptions. In 
which case, it is important to assess whether differences in the selectivity of prediction error 
provides a complete account for other CS focused effects.  
 
Alternative explanations for individual differences in CS focused effects 
 There are also alternative explanations for CS focused effects in human learning that 
do not presume a role for selective prediction error or selective attention. For example, De 
Houwer, Vandorpe and Beckers (2005) argued that blocking in human learning can result 
from participants drawing higher level inferences of the form “cues A and B together cause 
the outcome to occur with the same probability as does cue A alone; this implies that cue B is 
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not a cause of the outcome.” From this approach, individual difference in blocking may 
reflect individual difference in inferential reasoning rather than attention (e.g., Garety, 
Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Mitchell et al., 2009; Sellen, Oaksford & Gray, 2005), which 
itself may involve a complex form of associative generalization. 
Schizotypy-related differences in learning, have also been studied using complex 
configural discriminations (e.g., Haddon, George, Grayson, McGowan, Honey and Killcross, 
2011). Individuals with high levels of introverted anhedonia are impaired solving a 
biconditional discrimination, suggesting an inability to treat the co-occurrence of stimuli as a 
unique configuration. The biconditional discrimination (AX+, AY-, BX-, BY+) requires 
participants to learn about multiple co-occurring stimuli (Byrom & Murphy, 2016; Saavedra, 
1975). Thus, this finding of individual difference in biconditional discrimination mirrors, 
Cohen and Servan-Schreiber’s (1992) suggestion that cognitive deficits observed in 
schizophrenia reflect a dysfunction of unitary a cognitive context mechanism, resulting in an 
inability to maintain or use task setting information to guide ongoing behavior. Such impaired 
ability to use task setting information might relate to negative symptoms in particular (e.g., 
Thoma, Zoppelt, Wiebel, & Daum, 2007). 
Differences in the extent to which individuals use configurations of cues may still 
reflect differences in attention. Attentional breadth, a cognitive trait related to emotional 
arousal (Fredrickson, 2001), relates to an ability to solve configural discriminations such as 
negative patterning and biconditional discriminations (Byrom & Murphy 2014; 2016, 2017; 
see also McDonald et al. 1998, for an evaluation of the hippocampus in these tasks). Thus, 
while differences in ability to learn about multiple co-occurring stimuli may relate to some 
underlying ability to maintain or use task setting information, these differences may be 
related to attention. Further work is necessary here to clarify this relationship.  
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In summary, individual differences in learning may interact with genetic and 
environmental factors to cause symptoms of schizophrenia. In this respect differences in 
learning may be a key component of the etiology of schizophrenia. Individual differences in 
learning have been taken as support for the aberrant salience hypothesis of schizophrenia, 
supporting the assumption of differences in attention. However, it is far from clear that 
individual differences in CS focused effects, such as latent inhibition, should be attributed to 
attention alone. Further work is necessary to isolate the mechanisms underpinning CS 
focused effects and thus the causal basis of individual differences in such effects. 
 
Example 4: Individual Differences in Contingency Learning and Depression.  
 As with anxiety and addiction, discussed above, gene x environment models are used 
to explain the etiology of depression. Heritability rates for depression are estimated between 
40% and 50%, suggesting a substantive genetic contribution to risk for depression (Lohoff, 
2010). Further, specific candidate genes have been investigated, including the serotonin 
transporter gene (Caspi, Hariri, Holmes, Uher, & Moffitt, 2010), the Brain-Derived 
Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF) gene (Hashimoto, 2010) and the Tryptophan Hydroxylase gene 
(Zill, Baghai & Ackenheil, 2004; for review see, Wray et al., 2012). Diathesis-stress theories 
develop the gene x environment model suggesting that stress interacts with a potential 
predisposition leading to psychopathology (Monroe & Reid, 2009; Monroe & Simons, 1991). 
However, the mechanism by which any of these genes interacts with environmental factors to 
increase risk for depression remains unclear. For instance, while the short allele of the 
serotonin transporter gene appears to influence sensitivity to the environment, heightening 
sensitivity to stress, how this translates into a depressed state is not clear (Caspi et al., 2010, 
see also Dayan & Huys, 2008). 
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We have already argued that (1) both genetic and environmental factors contribute to 
the development of differences in learning, and that (2) once established, differences in 
learning interact with genetic and environmental factors to increase risk. In the context of 
depression, the well-established effect of learned helplessness supports these hypotheses, 
providing an illustration of environmental factors (experience) establishing a stable difference 
in learning, which creates an independent risk factor. Learned helplessness describes an 
approach to learning, developed through experience of aversive events that an individual has 
no control over (Seligman, 1972). Learned helplessness has been observed in species as 
diverse as honey bees (Dinges, Varnon, Cota, Slykerman & Abramson, 2017), dogs 
(Seligman, 1972) and humans (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975). Here an environmental factor 
contributes to establishing a specific approach to future learning, creating individual 
differences in causal reasoning. Once established, learned helplessness will shape the 
subsequent influences of the environment on behavior, in a gene x mind x environment 
interaction (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1972; see also Maier & 
Seligman, 2016).  
Further, individuals differ in their risk for developing learned helplessness; increased 
sensitivity to a lack of causal control may increase the risk for developing learned 
helplessness. Alloy and Abramson (1979) identified this difference as depressive realism, 
which sets up a pathway to develop and maintain depression, with a self-reinforcing cycle. 
Individuals who are better able to learn about their lack of causal control are more likely to 
learn that they are helpless, increasing their risk for depression (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).  
Alloy and Abramson (1979) identified individual differences in the accuracy of 
mapping contingency judgements to this normative measure. Specifically, participants were 
told that over a set of discrete trials they could test whether their actions caused a given 
outcome. In a zero-contingency task, programmed so that the outcome happened equally 
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often in response to and in the absence of the participants’ actions, non-depressed participants 
tended to overestimate the contingency between action and outcome, while individuals with 
mild symptoms of depression accurately judged the zero contingency (see also, Yarritu, 
Matute, & Luque, 2015; Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo, 2014).  
A normative measure of the contingency between action and outcome (ΔP), describes 
the strength and direction of a contingent relationship in terms of the difference between the 
probability of the outcome occurring following an action, P(o|e) and the probability of the 
outcome occurring in the absence of the action (i.e., effect), P(o|~e), as shown in Figure 3 
(Allan, 1980). Judgements of control are broadly sensitive to manipulations of the statistical 
contingency between an action and an outcome (e.g., Baker, Murphy, Vallee-Tourangeau, 
1996; Shanks, 1987; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh & Baker, 1993). However, normative 
calculations of ΔP can remain unchanged while the probability of actions and outcomes are 
manipulated. In contrast to this some participants appear to be sensitive to shifts in these 
probabilities, altering judgements of causal control with changes in the probability of 
outcome or action independent of changes in contingency (Blanco, Matute & Vadillo, 2011; 
Murphy, Vallee-Tourangeau, Msetfi & Baker, 2005; Vallee-Tourangeau, Murphy, Drew, & 
Baker, 1998; Vallee-Tourangeau, Payton & Murphy, 2008).  
 
Why do individuals differ in judgements of control? 
The observation of a difference in contingency judgement alone, does not itself 
provide insight into how this difference occurs However, with careful manipulation of the 
parameters influencing judgements of causal control, we are closer to understanding why 
individuals differ in their perception of contingency. Several factors may be relevant to 
individual differences in judgments of control, including; differences in the speed of learning, 
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sensitivity to the context, time perception and activity rates. Some of these factors may arise 
as a product of learning and all influence learning, potentially explaining individual 
differences in judgements of causal control.  
Speed of Learning: One source of difference is perhaps the speed at which individuals 
learn. We know that the speed of contingency learning task is related to personality (e.g., 
openness-to-experience predicting performance Kaufman et al., 2010; Shanks, Lamberts, & 
Goldstone, 2005). Slow learning is more resistant to recent trial experience which, in an 
uncorrelated situation, is liable to misdirect the perceiver. Much like a difference between 
goal- and sign- tracking, with slow learning, the strong memory for the most recent event 
may override the long-term likelihood relation. 
Sensitivity to the Context: Low mood is associated with poor maintenance of 
contextual information (Msetfi, Murphy, Kornbort & Simpson, 2009). Competition with 
contextual cues can have powerful effects on learning (Baker et al., 1996; Baker et al., 2000; 
Murphy et al., 2005). Msetfi and colleagues (2005) showed that individual differences in 
judgments of causal control, seemingly related to depressive symptoms, were themselves 
related to context learning. Msetfi et al., manipulated the probability of outcomes occurring 
(outcome density; the rate at which outcomes occur in a given learning period) and the inter-
trial interval (ITI; the time gap between events), observing that individual differences in 
judgements of causal control were strongest with a high probability of outcomes occurring 
and long ITIs (Msetfi et al., 2005; Msetfi, Wade, & Murphy, 2013). The ITI provides 
experience of the background context in the absence of actions or outcomes. In terms of ΔP 
and the matrix in Figure 3, the ITI is equivalent to a cell D trial. Incorporating this into a 
normative calculation of contingency increases the contingency between action and outcome 
(or CS and US in a Pavlovian case). In terms of associative learning, exposure to the ITI 
provides experience of the context in the absence of the outcome, reducing the strength of 
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association between context and outcome and thus competition between the context and 
action for associative strength. Thus, through its influence on cue competition, reduced 
context processing can explain differences in judgements of causal control.  
Supporting the hypothesis that individual differences in contingency judgements 
relates to cue competition, Msetfi and colleagues (2005) found that manipulation of 
competing cues influenced learning. Individuals differed in contingency judgements only in 
conditions with a long ITI. Non-depressed individuals judged that they had control of the 
outcome, an effect that reflects extinction of the context-outcome association, boosting the 
action-outcome association. The absence of this effect in depressed individuals suggests that 
they were insensitive to the information occurring in the ITI or that this experience of the 
combination of context and no outcome did not influence their action-outcome association. 
This study suggests that differences in contingency learning, increasing risk of learned 
helplessness, relate to the influence of context learning on cue competition. 
While the role of context processing provides insight into how individual differences 
in judgements of causal control develop, differences in context processing need explaining. 
The ITI contains (a) the absence of action, (b) the absence of outcome, (c) the absence of 
stimuli and (d) the presence of the context. Differences in processing any of these 
components can explain differences in learning causal control. We do not propose that it is 
simple to identify individual differences in such learning. Indeed, research thus far suggests 
that differences in several different factors interact to influence learning.  
Time Perception, Attention, and Activity Rates: While there is some evidence of a 
relationship between low mood and altered time perception (Kornbort, Msetfi & Grimwood, 
2013), other studies suggest that apparent differences in time perception reflect ability to 
maintain attention (Msetfi, Murphy & Kornbort, 2012). Activity rates both influence causal 
learning and may be influenced by causal learning, in a mutually reinforcing relationship 
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(Byrom, Msetfi & Murphy, 2015). While some studies suggest that accurate judgements of 
causal control may arise due to low activity rates associated with low mood (Blanco, Matute, 
Vadillo, 2012), there is also evidence of high activity rates in individuals with low mood 
(Byrom et al., 2015). Changes in time perception, attention and activity rates could all 
contribute to differences in context processing and thus judgements of causal control, or may 
influence the perceived and actual components of a causal judgement experience, directly 
altering the perception of causal control.  
 
Summary 
To summarize, we wish to highlight several points. Individual differences in a simple 
effect of contingency learning may arise from a complex array of different and interacting 
factors. Where individual differences are observed, it is necessary to explore the factors 
underlying the individual differences and experiments need to manipulate parameters to 
begin to isolate the factors contributing to individual differences in learning. As illustrated in 
this example, these factors may relate directly to learning, or other cognitive factors, such as 
perception of time. It will only be in studying the interaction between parameter 
manipulations and individual differences that we can provide a comprehensive understanding 
of the mechanisms contributing to individual differences in learning. It is also clear that these 
behavioral effects are not simple consequences of a gene x environment interaction. 
It will not have escaped the observant reader that there is a mismatch between how we 
envisage the study of depressive realism informing understanding of the etiology of 
depression and the current evidence base. We started this section by suggesting that 
individual differences in contingency learning could contribute to risk for depression, 
specifically, enhanced ability to identify a zero-contingency relationship between actions and 
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outcomes would accentuate the development of learned helplessness, establishing a learning 
framework that would increase risk for depression. While we believe that individual 
differences in contingency learning will interact with genetic and environmental factors to 
contribute to risk for depression, the studies outlined above have all assessed how depression 
or low mood influences learning. Thus, we cannot state with any confidence that differences 
in contingency learning contribute to the etiology of depression, rather than arise as a result 
of depression. This is illustrative of an important gap in the research into individual 
differences in associative learning; if our understanding of individual differences in 
associative learning is to enhance our understanding of the etiology of differences in 
behavior, we need to be studying the development of difference.  
Conclusions 
We began this paper by situating animal learning and learning theory with the study 
of individual differences. We have argued that: 1) principles of learning are also principles of 
individual differences; 2) principles of learning provide a mechanism for understanding the 
contribution of the psychological to behavior; 3) learning theories, far from being too 
simplistic, provide a guide for how to explain different dissociable aspects of behavior. 
 We have argued for a gene x mind x environment interaction. Differences in learning, 
which might be established through the interaction of genetic and environmental factors, have 
an independent causal power, interacting with both genetic and environmental effects. The 
differences in learning that we have described extend beyond endophenotypes, being 
influenced by both genetics and environment. As such, we argue that the role of the mind in 
the interaction of gene and environment needs careful consideration as more than just part of 
the pathway through which genes exert an effect on phenotype.  
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 We acknowledge that many different factors influence individual differences in 
learning, including differences in attention, memory, and motivation. However, this is not a 
cause to abandon the associative model. What we must abandon is the idea that ‘mind’ is a 
veridical expression of experience, or a simple mediator of the real and prime gene x 
environment relation (see Figure 1). There is complexity enough within learning models to 
account for diversity in learning. What is needed are careful manipulations of experimental 
parameters to isolate the causal basis of individual differences in learning.  
 Throughout we have looked at various learning effects. These tend to be examined in 
isolation. We bring these together here because there are comparable threads of research 
across fear conditioning, sign-tracking and latent inhibition. Consideration of overlapping 
components of learning, should advance our understanding of individual differences in these 
effects. For instance, the distinction between learning about diffuse and discrete cues is 
apparent in individual differences in fear conditioning and sign-tracking. Differences in the 
ability to use contexts to cue appropriate performance and judgements have been proposed to 
account for individual difference in latent inhibition and judgment of control. Despite these 
overlaps, different mechanisms are proposed to explain individual difference in these effects 
in a way that lacks parsimony when individual differences in learning are considered in the 
whole.  
The history of animal learning offers another important lesson on the study of 
individual differences. Skinner’s behaviorist program eschewed the study of behavior in 
terms of differences between groups and even the development of an overarching theory 
(Skinner, 1938, 1945). In this, Skinner was interested in individual differences; his proposal 
was that each individual animal provided a unique, N=1, object of study and analysis. He also 
thought that cognitions and the contributions of an individual animal’s mind (which was 
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unobservable) to behavior, was beyond the scope of 20th century science. As we continue into 
the 21st century this challenge has become part of modern psychological study.  
More generally, the analysis of human medicine and psychology are recognizing that 
over-general rules of scientific analysis are insufficient to account for individual variability. 
For instance, cancer treatment is not a single causal event, but rather a treatment of cancer 
may be as unique as the individual patient. To diagnose and treat any individual may require 
understanding their unique genetic, environmental as well as psychosocial background (e.g., 
Kerry et al., 2012; Murphy, Byrom & Msetfi, 2017). The so called ‘person-centered’ medical 
movement is accompanied by a revaluation of the value of Randomized Control Trials and 
group statistical analyses as the most respected source of evidence based medicine (Kerry et 
al.,). Such radical thinking may require a similar radical response in psychology, an analysis 
of both group and individual, not just society or environment, but individual. Ultimately, if 
psychology is to provide an account of the human and animal condition we need our theories 
to describe how an individual’s learning experience comes to shape their behavior. 
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Figure 1. Mediation relationships between Genes, Environment, and the Associative Mind.  
  
Traditionally the associative ‘Mind’, a phenotype, is seen to be affected by genes and 
environment and has a moderating role on the relation between gene and environment but 
only a weak direct effect. We are proposing that mind can affect gene expression, and 
environment as well as each one being able to mediate the relation between each separate 
dyad. 
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Figure 2: Individual differences in CS processing effects.  
 
Panel A: During test trials participants give B, the blocked cue, a lower rating than D. This 
effect is abolished in individuals with high scores on the Introverted Anhedonia subscale of 
the OLIFE (e.g., Haselgrove & Evans, 2010).  
Panel B: Following selective learning, individuals are expected to give a comparable rating of 
the likelihood of a US following either AD or BC (Rescorla, 2001). Individuals with high 
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scores on the Introverted Anhedonia subscale of the OLIFE do not show evidence of selective 
learning in this test (Haselgrove & Evans, 2010).  
Panel C: Following the design shown in Table 1, Participants rate AC as strongly predictive 
of O3 and BD as strongly predictive of O4, giving a high discrimination score. VX and WY 
are rated as weak predictors of O3 and O4 respectively, giving a low discrimination score 
(see also, Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). This learned relevance effect is not apparent for 
individuals with high scores on the Unusual Experiences subscale of the OLIFE questionnaire 
(Le Pelley, Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, Lunter, & Morris, 2010). 
Panel D: Participants are slower to learn with a pre-exposed stimulus than a non-pre-exposed 
stimulus. This retardation of learning is disrupted in individuals with high scores on the 
Unusual Experiences subscale of the OLIFE (e.g., Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009).   
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Figure 3. Generic contingency matrix showing the relationship between the occurrence of an 
event and the occurrence of an outcome (e.g., behavior, stimulus). 
 
The notation a, b, c, d refer to the frequencies of each event-outcome conjunction. The 
normative model for the one-way relation between them is ΔP. ΔP = a/ (a + b) - c/(c + d) and 
generates a number between -1 and +1 denoting the strength and direction of the relationship.  
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Table 1 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Test 
(A) Blocking 
A + 
AB+ 
CD+ 
B 
D 
(B) Asymmetrical 
learning 
A+ 
B- 
C+ 
D- 
AB- 
AD 
BC 
(C) Learned 
Relevance 
AV – O1 
AW – O1 
BV – O2 
BW – O2 
CX – O2 
CY – O2 
DX – O1 
DY – O1 
AX – O3 
BY – O4 
CV – O3 
DW – O4 
AC 
BD 
VX 
WY 
(D) Latent 
Inhibition 
A 
A+ 
B+ 
 
  
Letters refer to different cues. O1 to 4 refer to different outcomes. + refers to the presence of 
an outcome, - refers to the absence of an outcome. Tests in humans have used the allergist 
task, or similar cover story, where participants are asked to act as an allergist and identify 
which foods (represented here by letters) cause an allergic reaction in a fictitious patient e.g., 
(Haselgrove & Evans, 2010; Le Pelley, Oakeshott, & McLaren, 2005).  
 
 
 
